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Abstract 
 
A ranking of a variety of incentive devices used by firms according to their perceived effectiveness by 
employees is identified.  The determinants of employee incentive preferences are also investigated, 
suggesting a ‘menu’ of conditions under which an organization’s personnel policies will have 
maximum motivational impact on its workforce.  Based on the beliefs of a unique sample of workers 
from seven European countries, the results suggest that (a) the primary determinant of the level of 
employee effort is the amount of discretion offered at work; (b) pay incentives and ‘gift exchanges’ are 
the most important motivators; (c) the use of monitoring and Taylor-type assembly lines are the least 
effective incentives; and (d) the optimal design of incentive strategies by firms is strongly shaped by a 
host of contextual factors.  The expressed desire for autonomy, and distaste for control, by employees 
gives credibility to the “participative” management approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Those who manage human resources within firms have a rich toolkit of incentive mechanisms at their 
disposal (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999).  The need for such a wide array of instruments arises due to 
the fundamental agency problem that plagues the employment relationship, whereby the interests of the 
contracting parties are typically in conflict.  It follows that firms may combat the ensuing problem of 
moral hazard by designing appropriate incentive contracts that seek to establish goal congruence with 
their employees (Holmstrom, 1979; Mirlees, 1976).   
As noted by Prendergast (1999, p. 7), these modes of furnishing employee effort vary widely across 
different organizations, with some firms relying on explicit contracts that tie pay to observable 
measures of (individual or aggregate) performance (e.g. piece rates, stock options, bonuses, profit 
sharing etc.), others preferring reward systems that are based on more discretionary/subjective measures 
of productivity and some eschewing the use of pay-for-performance altogether in favour of alternative 
(dynamic) strategies (e.g. promotions, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, career concerns, 
layoffs etc.).  Bryson et al. (2008) have also shown that there has been considerable growth in the use of 
“families” of contingent rewards at the same workplace in the UK in the last two decades, while 
Belfield and Marsden (2003) discover evidence of significant experimentation amongst UK managers 
seeking for the optimal “bundle” of compensation for their individual establishment.    
Economists have made considerable progress in the past three decades in terms of understanding 
the internal workings of the incentive structure of organizations.  The principal-agent model focuses on 
the trade-off between risk and incentives (Holmstrom, 1979; Mirlees, 1976).  The efficiency wage 
paradigm postulates an inverse relationship between market rents and monitoring sustained by the 
threat of layoffs (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Moreover, 
tournament theory emphasizes the relative competition among workers for fixed prizes (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981).  The above literature remains central for our understanding of the framework which 
compels and constrains firms in designing their incentive policies.   
Researchers have also investigated the conditions influencing the choice of different reward 
schemes by firms, such as the dimensionality of job tasks and the monitoring environment inter alia 
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(Belfield and Marsden, 2003; Bryson et al. (2008); Drago and Garvey, 1998; Frederiksen and Takats, 
2004; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; MacLeod and Parent, 1998).  
Furthermore, empirical and experimental studies have attempted to ascertain whether employees 
actually respond to such a variety of performance metrics (Lazear, 2000; Marsden et al., 2001).    
Despite the above innovations, the economic literature has not paid sufficient attention to an 
important link of the incentives-productivity chain, namely the beliefs of employees about their 
effectiveness.  This is an important omission given that the success of any compensation scheme hinges 
critically on the value assigned to it by employees (Heneman and Young, 1991; Nigro, 1981).  Reward 
schemes that enjoy higher perceived worker value can act as powerful attraction, retention and 
motivational tools (e.g. the stock options granted by many high-tech companies in the mid-1990s).  
Finding out what employees think about their remuneration plans can also help identify those 
motivational components that are likely to have the greatest impact on worker performance, thus 
allowing firms to restructure their human resource (HR) procedures accordingly.  Indeed, it is generally 
agreed that the successful alignment of rewards with business strategy relies very much on 
understanding employee reward perceptions (Lawler, 1995; Wilson, 1995).   
The above underscores the necessity of research that will assist in our understanding of the 
taxonomy of workers’ reward preferences and their determinants.  Although a number of recent studies 
have looked at the relationship between different forms of incentive pay and individual job satisfaction 
(Artz, 2008; Drago et al., 2002; Green and Heywood, 2008; Heywood and Wei, 2006; McCausland et 
al., 2005; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009), few studies exist that identify employee beliefs about the 
incentive mix that is most likely to drive and motivate optimal performance.  In addition, knowledge of 
the specific conditions that influence these views is incomplete at best. 
This study aims to address the above gaps in knowledge.  To do so, employees from seven 
European countries have been requested to subjectively evaluate the relevance of a number of incentive 
options for the effort they exert in their jobs.  Insofar as employees’ ‘stated’ preferences act as a signal 
of their ‘actual’ effort choices, and provided that firms pay attention to the opinions of their workforce, 
this study provides potentially valuable insight into the prevalence of some reward schemes over others 
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in the contemporary workplace.  Moreover, by investigating the conditions under which incentive 
options are considered to be effective by employees themselves, a ‘menu’ of factors which may be 
conducive to securing employee support for an organization’s compensation strategy is identified. 
The structure of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 integrates the predictions of the 
available economic, management and psychological literature on the determinants of employee reward 
preferences, and describes the incentive alternatives used in the survey of this study.  In section 3 the 
dataset and summary statistics of the variables of interest are presented.  Section 4 outlines the main 
results, identifying the relative ranking of the incentive options and the underlying determinants of their 
perceived effectiveness.  Section 5 considers the implications of the findings for the purposes of 
effective human resource policy.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The availability of incentive options 
 
The aim of this paper is to elicit the perceptions of employees about the relative importance of a number 
of incentive alternatives for their effort exposure at the workplace.  Given that individuals who are 
active in the labour market are likely to have formed concrete beliefs about the effectiveness of 
different motivational schemes, it seems reasonable to ask them directly about their views in the form 
of a survey questionnaire.  This was done via a unique survey of lower- and middle-skilled workers 
from seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
UK), that took place in the year 2004 as part of the EU-funded EPICURUS project.  Thus, for the 
remainder of this section, a brief description of the incentive categories that were included in the survey 
is offered, along with a discussion of the reasons that underlined their selection as suggested by the 
existing literature. 1    
 
- The risk of losing your job:  Perhaps the most common channel of incentive provision used by firms is 
the threat of dismissal if the performance of employees falls below some critical level (Kwon, 2005).  
With this non-linear contract firms may pay wages that vary little with performance, yet the threat of 
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firing acts as a binding constraint on the actions of workers.  Agell (1994), for instance, finds a positive 
relationship between effort and workers’ perception of the likelihood of layoff.  Bewley (1999: 110) 
argues, however, that firms are reluctant to use the dismissal card as it is bad for morale.   
 
- Pay incentives: In order to ameliorate the agency problem, it has been suggested that a principal 
should condition the payments of workers on a set of verifiable (collective or individual) signals, which 
are informative about the agent’s effort (e.g. realization of output).  Moral hazard will then be less 
likely to come into play the greater the sensitivity of pay to measured performance.  The optimal 
contract must nonetheless balance the goals of full insurance and first-best incentives.  The 
psychological theory of cognitive evaluation has also asserted that extrinsic intervention may have a 
detrimental effect on employee performance due to crowding-out of intrinsic job satisfaction (Deci, 
1971; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lepper et al., 1973) or because of distortion in the nature of the 
psychological contract (Benhabou and Tirole, 2003; Kreps, 1997; Sliwka, 2003).  Furthermore, PRP 
systems may be detrimental to employee morale (Bewley, 1999) and perceptions of job security (Baker 
et al., 1988; Valetta, 1999), are likely to undermine team work (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) and 
creativity and innovation (Kohn, 1993), and may influence certain facets of job satisfaction in a 
negative fashion (Green and Heywood, 2008; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009).      
.   
- Closer monitoring (supervision or appraisals): Related to the risk of layoff is another method that is 
conventionally believed to resolve the agency problem, namely the use of intense monitoring.  This 
may be accomplished either by delegating the responsibility of overseeing worker effort to a supervisor, 
or via in-depth evaluations of employee performance that culminate in the drafting of reports and 
appraisals by HR managers.  In both cases, tighter monitoring by the principal is expected to induce 
effort by workers who wish to reduce the risk of a penalty if caught shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Nagin et al., 1998).   
Moreover, it has been suggested that subjective performance evaluation is desirable since it rewards 
a more holistic measure of worker performance (Prendergast, 1999).  The problem with subjective 
assessments, though, is that they cannot be verified by outsiders, and, thus, there is ample scope for 
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manipulation of the performance measures (e.g. “centrality”/“leniency” biases; supervisory favoritism 
responding to rent-seeking actions by workers) that often results in employee discontent (Lawler, 1971, 
p. 171; Prendergast, 2002). 
More recent arguments challenging the disciplining potential of stringent monitoring evolve around 
the so-called “crowding out” theory, which postulates that the use of ‘sticks’ by employers entails 
hidden costs as workers may perceive such controls as a signal of distrust (Falk and Kosfeld, 2004; 
Frey, 1993).  
 
- Akerlof’s ‘gift exchange’ and efficiency wages: If intense monitoring is to be avoided or is costly in its 
implementation, the so-called ‘efficiency wage’ theories have claimed that firms can induce effort 
exertion by offering wage rents to workers.  Though these theories share the common notion that a level 
of pay in excess of the ‘going rate’ will have a positive effect on productivity, the channels via which 
this process takes place differ (e.g. reduced turnover, superior pool of applicants, higher effort etc.; see 
Krueger and Summers, 1998).  This study focuses on the so-called ‘fair wage’ model of Akerlof (1982), 
which has argued that effort increases as the offered wage rises relative to what workers believe to be a 
‘fair’ pay rate, formed by comparison to an appropriate reference group (such as similarly qualified 
workers).   
Evidence has established the existence of reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation among 
hypothetical employers and employees (Fehr et al., 1997; Dohmen et al., 2009).  Management science 
and psychology research, in contrast, has failed to support a causal link between higher pay levels and 
motivation or productivity, though there is ample evidence that effort is increased by incentives that 
make pay depend on performance (Lawler, 1971; 133; Vroom, 1964: 252).   
 
- Peer pressure:  Most workers are employed in settings where final output is the outcome of the joint 
contribution of individuals.  Consequently, firms that decide to utilize team production incentive 
schemes are likely to face the classic free-rider (or 1/N) problem, whereby agents fail to internalize the 
benefits that accrue to other members of the team when making their own effort decisions (Prendergast, 
1999: 39).  Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggested that a possible solution to this team production 
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problem is peer pressure, whereby agents monitor one another and mete out punishments to those 
colleagues who fail to perform adequately, provided that the cost of delivering such sanctions is 
sufficiently low.  After all, human beings are social beings who are willing to perform certain activities 
(e.g. contribution to a public good/punishment of free-riding) simply for the sake of obtaining social 
approval (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Gachter and Fehr, 1999).   
Furthermore, the empirical evidence of Weiss (1987) and Hansen (1997) suggests that peer pressure 
could be an effective motivator for blue-collar workers in particular, whereas their white-collar 
counterparts are more likely to be motivated by individual-based pay schemes instead.      
 
- Closer contact with clients and customers: ‘Business literacy’ is a popular concept in employee 
motivation research.  Business literacy is defined as employees “thinking like strategic business 
partners” (Philpott et al., 2005).  This is usually achieved by companies investing considerable effort in 
helping individuals to link personal with organizational goals.  After all, firms recognize that many 
workers invest their lives and financial security in the company, so that employees who better realize 
how their job supports the mission and vision of the firm are likely to enhance their sense of belonging 
and satisfaction (Heller, 2005).  
 In this spirit, many companies build and nurture an organizational culture centered on customer 
driven service (Kiska, 2004).  It is therefore expected that employees will be motivated by the need to 
satisfy the needs of the firm’s clientele.  Indeed, HR managers who aspire to have a business-literate 
workforce will ensure that workers will receive direct feedback about their impact on customer 
satisfaction.  Employees are then motivated by the awareness that their future progression within the 
company will depend on how well they are meeting customer expectations.  
 
- Assembly lines:  The dominant strategy adopted by many firms in the past was to deskill jobs, and, 
thus, exercise tighter control over how work was performed.  This approach was heavily influenced by 
the theories and methods of F.W. Taylor, which aimed to improve the employer’s position in conflicts 
over the control and price of labour.  This was accomplished by deconstructing jobs into simple, 
repetitive tasks that were executed within the specified constraints of automated assembly lines.  The 
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effort required from workers could then be precisely monitored and calculated by supervisors.  Since 
such jobs required low-grade labour, which would be cheaply available and would require little 
training, workers could then be reduced to a disposable resource (Palmer, 1983). 
Taylorite schemes are particularly effective in manufacturing employment, which explains why this 
option was included in a survey of mostly blue-collar workers.  Nevertheless, with the decline of the 
manufacturing sector as a share of national output, such techniques of managerial control have become 
increasingly irrelevant in modern labour markets. 
 
2.2 Determinants of incentive preferences 
Few studies have given explicit consideration to the topic of employee reward preferences, with most of 
them originating from the fields of management and psychology.  The primary focus has been the 
detection of determinants of employee support for various incentive tools.  A number of interesting 
predictions have been made, summarized in Table 1 for convenience.  Most of these are based on the 
predictions of the psychological theories of motivation that emphasize the notions of ‘expectancy’ and 
‘equity’ as drivers of employee performance (Adams, 1963; Bartol and Locke, 2000; Lawler, 1973).2 
For instance, Andrews and Henry (1963), Bergmann et al. (1983), Torrington (1993) and Brown 
(2001) find that with increased age there is less emphasis on merit pay and more support for seniority or 
tenure-based systems, as the appetite for risk decreases over the years.  In Hallock and Olson’s (2009) 
case-study, older workers and females are found to prefer guaranteed base pay relative to stock options.  
Koys et al. (1989) and Majors (1988) attribute this to a preference for equitable pay systems by 
females, though Golding (1986) and Brown (2001) emphasize the desirability of performance-related 
pay (PRP) schemes given that women suffer from a higher incidence of labour force intermittency. 
A number of important job-related factors have also been highlighted as being conducive to the 
offer of extrinsic rewards.  These mostly describe the “monitoring environment” of a workplace (Fernie 
and Metcalfe, 1999), such as low costs of output measurement, low supervision intensity, large 
workgroup sizes (Brown, 1990), repetitive job tasks (McLeod and Parent, 1999), minimal teamwork 
(Kohn, 1993; Marsden and Richardson, 1994), high worker heterogeneity (of ability), low risk aversion, 
no union recognition (Balkin, 1989; Brown, 2001; Drago and Heywood, 1995), short tenure (Lazear, 
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1979), low task complexity (Drago and Garvey, 1998; McLeod and Parent, 1999) and high product 
market competition.  Furthermore, an increased preference for at risk pay (such as PRP) is found for 
higher-paid individuals (Hallock and Olson, 2009; Mahoney, 1964; McCausland et al., 2005), those 
who believe that they are underpaid relative to comparable workers (Brown, 2001; 51), those in private 
sector jobs (Burgess and Rato, 2003) and those enjoying (suffering from) good (bad) relations with their 
superiors (colleagues) (Beer and Gery, 1972; Brown, 2001; Greenberg, 1990; Milkovich and Newman, 
1996).      
Environmental determinants that may influence employee perceptions have been proposed too, 
such as the state of the labour market (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998) and job insecurity (Brown, 
2001; 41), both of which enhance the disciplining power of unemployment and make PRP schemes less 
desirable due to their inherent uncertainty.  Cross-country differences in preferences for incentives have 
also been identified (Chiang and Birtch, 2005; Marjaana et al., 2005), depending on whether cultures 
are more individualistic or collectivist (Hofstede, 1980).  
Finally, Beer and Gery (1972) have shown that an individual’s past experience of an appraisal 
system informs expectations about what it would be like under a given pay scheme, and this determines 
future pay adjustment preferences of employees.   
     
3. Data and summary statistics 
 
The data for this study are derived from a survey of workers in lower- and middle-skilled occupations 
that was undertaken as part of the EU-funded EPICURUS project in August and September 2004 in 
seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK).  For 
the purpose of comparability, individuals from all countries responded to an (appropriately translated) 
identical questionnaire.  A specialized survey company was used to ensure that appropriate 
dissemination and data collection procedures were followed (e.g. stratified random sampling, adequate 
response rate etc.).3  Moreover, due to time and budget considerations it was decided that a homogenous 
group of individuals should be chosen.  The final sample therefore includes salaried workers whose 
employment is the main activity (excluding students), employed in all industries except agriculture and 
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fishery, between the ages of 18 to 65, with a maximum educational level of 4 in the ISCED 
International Classification of 1997.   
The data was administered online via the Internet, except for Greece where face-to-face interviews 
were organized instead, since the degree of Internet penetration at the time of the survey was relatively 
low in that country.  The eventual size of the sample varies in each country as follows: 1,011 
observations in Denmark, 1,008 in France, 1,007 in the Netherlands, 1,002 in the United Kingdom, 800 
in Greece, 331 in Finland and 304 in Spain.  In order to facilitate a robust empirical analysis the 
individual country samples have been pooled, resulting in an overall cross-section sample of 5463 
European employees.      
The content of the completed database is fairly extensive in terms of describing the labour market 
conditions of individuals.  First, wide-ranging information is available about individual and household 
characteristics.  Secondly, the survey contains extensive descriptions of the working conditions that 
prevail in the respondents’ current jobs.  With regard to the particular questions of interest to this study, 
people were asked to answer the following questions regarding the importance of a number of 
motivational devices for either the level or the marginal change in their job effort: 
 
Which, if any, of the items listed below are important for the level of effort you put in your work? Please 
grade each factor with a number from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for ‘very unimportant’ and 5 stands 
for ‘very important’. 
 
(i) a machine or assembly line; (ii) clients or customers; (iii) a supervisor or boss; (iii) your 
colleagues; (v)  your own discretion; (vi) payment incentives (e.g. extra payments, premiums, 
bonuses, piece rates – i.e. payment by results); (vii) reports and appraisals. 
 
Which, if any, of the items listed below are important for inducing you to increase your effort in your 
job? Please grade each factor with a number from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for ‘very unimportant’ 
and 5 stands for ‘very important’. 
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 (i) speeding up the machine or assembly line; (ii) closer contact with clients and customers; (iii) 
stricter supervision;  (iii) your fellow workers’ opinion; (v)  pay incentives; (vi) reports and 
appraisals; (vii) being paid more than similarly qualified colleagues working in other firms.   
 
Table 2 illustrates summary statistics on some of the variables contained in the survey which reflect 
the heterogeneity in the respondents’ current job experiences (e.g. experience of specific incentive 
tools).  These may potentially affect their views on the importance of the aforementioned incentive 
options.  It is evident that the selected sample is mostly comprised of individuals working on private 
sector, non-unionised, permanent contract jobs.  The majority of the respondents also state that they 
usually work with the same people and on jobs involving a variety of duties, though for a significant 
portion of the sample fixed work routines are the norm.  Moreover, the workers are distributed evenly 
across establishments of varying sizes and are mainly employed within the services sector.   
Importantly, 20% of the employees in the sample are recipients of some form of performance-based 
gain-sharing bonus in their current employment, while 7% are subject to individual compensation by 
merit.  A significant portion of the sample also suffers from job insecurity, while most respondents 
believe that their relationships with their co-workers and supervisors are good and that they earn 
approximately the same pay as other similarly qualified workers.  The conclusion that one can draw 
from Table 2 is that to obtain a fuller understanding of the conditions under which various incentive 
tools may motivate a firm’s workforce, an empirical investigation of the correlation between workers’ 
perceptions and the above (individual/job) characteristics is required.  
 
4. Econometric results 
 
4.1 Ranking of the importance of incentive alternatives 
Prior to examining the underlying factors that influence the beliefs of the respondents, the relative 
ranking of the offered motivators in terms of their perceived effectiveness is firstly identified.  As the 
objective is to infer the workers’ preferences over a discrete set of alternatives, the rank-ordered logit 
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(ROL) model is used (Beggs et al., 1981), as this is the standard tool for analyzing preferences in case 
rank data.4   
In the spirit of the conventional random utility framework (Manski, 1977), the effort ratings of each 
surveyed individual i = 1,…,N, over the set of incentive options, j =1,…J, are represented as a set of 
latent variables **
,...,1 iJi ee , defined as  
 
   
where Vij is the deterministic part of the rating determined by the interaction of individual observable 
characteristics (as given by the m-dimensional vector xi) and the relative weights associated with the 
alternatives j (given by the m-dimensional parameter vector β), while εij is the random component of the 
ratings.  
Assuming that the respondents’ ratings imply a complete ordering, ri, of the importance of each 
incentive tool, so that **2
*
1 .... iJii eee >> , and that εij follows an independent type-I extreme value 
distribution (McFadden, 1974), the probability of observing a particular ranking ri equals 
 
 
where use is made of Efron’s method of handling potential “ties” in the workers’ responses (i.e. 
indifference among the alternatives as indicated by equal effort scores). 
The estimates of a ROL model of the importance of various motivators for job effort are given in 
Table 3, from which a number of consistent patterns emerge.  The principal finding is that the European 
employees of the sample consider the existence of discretion in their jobs as the most important factor 
affecting their effort decisions.  The desire for approval by one’s peers and consideration for the needs 
of the firm’s clientele follow in importance.  Interestingly, pay incentives are considered by employees 
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as being of lesser relevance for the level of their effort.  Even less important is the existence of 
monitoring in the workplace, in the form of supervision or the drafting of reports and appraisals.  
Finally, working in an assembly line is consistently graded as the least significant determinant of 
worker effort choices.   
In contrast to the effect of pay incentives on the level of effort, Table 3 clearly shows that such 
rewards are highly capable of inducing a change in effort.  The respondents also perceive a ‘gift 
exchange’ as a potentially important incentive device.  In other words, if firms offer a wage premium 
over what is regarded to be a ‘fair wage’, they would be willing to wield extra effort.  The fear of 
dismissal, peer or customer pressure and reports and appraisals all follow in terms of their relative 
significance in affecting worker effort.  Finally, the existence of strict supervision and the possibility of 
speeding up the assembly line are consistently ranked as the least effective amongst all effort-
enhancers. 
It should be noted that a remarkable cross-country similarity in the findings is found (discussed in 
the Appendix).  This is consistent with the findings of Chiang and Birtch (2005), who argue that with 
the internationalization of the economic environment cross-country convergence in reward systems and 
employee preferences has ensued.  It therefore appears to be the case that the influence of national 
culture on reward preference has given way to a host of other contextual variables, such as organization, 
industry and environmental characteristics, which are examined closely in the next section.    
 
4.2  Determinants of the perceived effectiveness  of incentive alternatives 
The optimal mix of incentive mechanisms that is expected to command high employee support is likely 
to be strongly shaped by a multitude of variables, as suggested in Table 1.  This section aims to identify 
those conditions, thereby proposing a ‘menu’ of factors which may be conducive to the design of 
effective motivation policies by firms. 
Given the ordered discrete nature (ranging from 1 to 5) of the individuals’ ratings, an Ordered 
Probit (OP) technique may be used to uncover the determinants that increase the probability of higher 
stated effort scores.  Nevertheless, due to the highly skewed nature of the effort responses, an 
alternative estimation method of ordered response data is utilized, namely a “semi-nonparametric” 
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estimator for a series of generalized models that nests the OP model (Stewart, 2004).  This estimator, 
first proposed by Gallant and Nychka (1987), has been recently advocated by Stewart (2004) on the 
grounds that it provides a more flexible and general fit to a large class of unknown densities and relaxes 
the distributional assumptions of the OP model.  For the sake of brevity further details of this estimator 
are provided in the Appendix.5 
The predictions of separate regressions of equation (1) for each of the incentive options available in 
the survey are summarized in Tables 4A and 4B (the full regression output is available in the 
Appendix).  The tables classify a list of determinants that are likely to enhance the perceived 
effectiveness of each incentive device.  A striking conclusion is that in many instances the forecasts of 
standard economic models (e.g. agency theory) and the beliefs of employees coincide with respect to 
the optimal conditions for offering certain incentive tools.   
Examining individual characteristics first, it is clear that male workers consider pay incentives to be 
less important determinants of the level of effort compared to their female counterparts, which is in line 
with the findings of Goldin (1986) and Brown (2001).  Male employees are also relatively less likely to 
be motivated by monitoring, efficiency wages and the threat of firing, yet they regard assembly lines as 
important for their effort decisions.   
As predicted on the basis of their differing risk aversion, older employees are less likely to believe 
that monetary rewards are critical for inducing additional effort.  Older workers are also less likely than 
their younger colleagues to think that supervision, peer pressure and efficiency wages are effective 
tools, and they seem to highly value the offer of discretion in their work.    
In section 2 it was argued that workers with longer seniority will be less stimulated by the offer of 
PRP compared to those with shorter tenure spans, and this is indeed borne out in the data.  The 
crowing-out hypothesis might also underpin the negative feelings of senior employees for any type of 
monitoring.  
The outcomes on a number of variables that describe the monitoring environment of the workplace 
and the nature of the job correspond to the suggestions of Table 1 concerning the preference for output- 
versus input-based pay.  The larger the establishment size, the greater the probability that pay 
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incentives, the risk of layoff and assembly lines are considered important.  In contrast, employees in 
larger establishments are less likely to be in regular contact with clients, hence their lack of motivation 
by customer satisfaction.  Pecuniary rewards and assembly lines are valued highly by workers who are 
employed in jobs involving repetitive tasks, on fixed routines and requiring on-site clocking or signing-
in.  Furthermore, when the nature of the job involves low task complexity, the discretion that is awarded 
to employees and the lack of supervision becomes paramount to their effort.   
In contrast to prior expectations (Booth and Frank, 1999; McCausland et al, 2005), no significant 
differences are found with respect to the perceived effectiveness of extrinsic rewards between workers 
of different wage levels.  Lower-paid workers are nonetheless significantly more likely to wield extra 
effort in the face of the threat of dismissal.  Lower absolute and relative wages also increase the 
perceived effectiveness of a ‘gift exchange’ as a motivational device.  This agrees with Brown’s (2001; 
51) assertion that workers who believe that they are underpaid relative to equivalent colleagues regard 
PRP schemes as a means of restoring equity.  Lower-paid workers also do not trust subjective 
appraisals probably due to a general feeling of vulnerability on their behalf.   
For those who work in rotating teams pressure amongst peers operates as a significant deterrent 
compared to those who always work alongside the same people.  In addition, workers who are on good 
terms with their colleagues consider the option of pay incentives as less significant, as they may believe 
that PRP is liable to provoke envious behaviour (Drago and Garvey, 1998; Marsden et al., 2001).  PRP 
is also less likely to be considered important by those workers who enjoy a healthy relationship with 
their supervisor, while the opposite holds for the options of ‘supervision’ and the ‘risk of redundancy’. 
According to Table 1, individuals who are subject to feelings of job insecurity are less enticed by 
the offer of pay incentives and feel more content with the up-front offer of efficiency wages.  This is 
confirmed by the employees’ responses, as it is shown that a greater probability of losing one’s job 
results in a higher ranking of the efficiency wage incentive option, while permanent contract holders 
(who enjoy a relative sense of job security) are more sympathetic to the PRP alternative.  Workers who 
think that it is likely to lose their jobs are also less intimidated by the threat of firing.     
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As expected, pay incentives are considered to be less important motivators by trade union members 
as well as individuals who are employed within the non-profit sector and (less so) the civil service.  For 
the latter, the opinion of peers is found to be a more significant incentive device instead.  Moreover, 
customer satisfaction appears to play a notable role within the non-manufacturing sectors, whereas 
manufacturing workers clearly perceive assembly lines as being a crucial determinant of their effort.    
Finally, evidence is found that prior experience with particular reward systems is likely to affect the 
attitudes of workers about their perceived effectiveness (Beer and Gery, 1972).  For instance, those 
employees who are already paid under some form of PRP scheme regard such mechanisms as 
significant determinants of their level of effort, while those who are paid by merit view the appraisal 
process in a more favourable fashion.                 
 
4.3  Mismatch between employee preferences and firm practices 
In a recent survey of the American workforce, LeBlanc and Mulvey (1998; 25) demonstrated that there 
exists a wide discrepancy in the preferred approaches to pay by employers and their employees, noting 
that “…workers prefer permanent base increases based on merit, while management is fonder of one-
time variable pay systems, since these systems cost less and are more short-term focused”.  A final 
issue that is therefore examined in this paper is whether there exists an inconsistency between the 
employees’ beliefs regarding the manner in which they “ought” to be paid in order to be productive, 
conditional on the determinants shown above, and the usage of actual incentive mechanisms within 
their current jobs.   
In order to investigate this, we focus on the ‘pay incentives’ option and use a probit model that 
predicts the probability that the workers’ responses will be at the top of the effort scale (i.e. 4 or 5), 
given the set of explanatory variables that were discussed above (but excluding their current experience 
with PRP).  On the basis of the predicted probability statistic (using a cut-off probability of 0.5), the 
sample of workers is then divided into those who believe that they “ought” to be paid by PRP in order 
to exert a high level of effort and those that “ought not”.6  Combining this binary information with the 
available data on the employees’ actual receipt of monetary rewards in their current jobs, it then 
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becomes possible to detect whether a significant mismatch exists between employee perceptions and 
tangible job market practices.7                    
On the basis of the above classification, Table 5 reveals that about 23-24% of those workers who 
believe that pay incentives are crucial for their effort decisions are indeed recipients of actual extrinsic 
forms of pay.  In constrast, less than 10% of those who consider the PRP alternative as insignificant are 
found in jobs which offer contingent payments.  So the evidence suggests that the pay preferences of 
employees are somewhat satisfied in practice.  A notable mismatch remains, however, with 76-77% of 
the employees considering PRP an effective tool not being offered such an alternative in the real job 
market.  There is thus significant scope for firms to modify their existing compensation systems by 
paying closer attention to the reward preferences of their workers. 
 
5. Implications for human resource policy 
 
The results of this study can be summed up by a number of largely interrelated conclusions, which are 
highly relevant for the conduct of HR managerial policy: (a) the primary determinant of the level of 
employee effort is the amount of discretion offered to workers; (b) pay incentives and reciprocal 
employer-employee behaviour (as in Akerlof’s ‘gift exchange’ theory) are considered by workers to be 
the most important factors for inducing marginal changes in their effort; (c) the use of ‘sticks’ (in the 
form of strict supervision and appraisals) and Tayloristic assembly lines are likely to be 
counterproductive; and (d) the optimal design of motivational policies by firms is strongly shaped by a 
host of contextual (individual, organizational and environmental) factors.   
Overall, the findings reveal that the low-skilled employees in the sample have a marked preference 
for a more task-integrated and flatter organizational structure, with decentralization of responsibility 
and worker participation in decision making (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000).  This contrasts with the 
traditional mode of work for blue-collar jobs, which typically involves a task-specialized structure that 
can be easily monitored via an ‘impersonal’ pyramidal hierarchy of line management and mechanical 
controls.         
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The expressed desire of employees for more autonomy, coupled with their aversion for rule by fear, 
also gives credence to the contemporary fashion of “participative” management.  This particular 
management style strives to “increase communication in all directions, upward, horizontally, and 
downward within the company chain of command; to push decision making down to the level at which 
the appropriate information was available; to have employees take initiatives to improve operations; to 
eliminate layers of middle management; and to have employees work as near equals in teams with 
minimal supervision” (Bewley, 1999; 46).  This managerial approach contrasts with the more stern and 
ruthless cost-cutting school, which relies on both fear of authority and fear of job loss, thus diminishing 
the stake employees have in their company.   
Based on the subjective beliefs of workers in this paper, incentives that make pay depend on 
performance are regarded as effective motivation instruments, though they have little effect on the level 
of motivation.  The Akerlof idea of loyalty and reciprocation to employers’ ‘gifts’ is also viewed 
favourably.  This agrees with Bewley’s (1999; 431) suggestion that even when effective financial 
incentives exist, they and employee goodwill should be thought of as mutually reinforcing.  After all, 
“workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on 
coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators” (ibid; 431).            
Finally, the results of this paper provide some support to Falk and Kosfeld’s (2004) behavioural 
rationale for the deliberate incompleteness of many real-life contracts.  The employee responses suggest 
that characteristics of the workplace environment that limit freedom of choice and signal distrust, such 
as high levels of monitoring and surveillance, may lead to lower performance on their behalf.  
Consequently, “if the principal anticipates this effect, he may be better off choosing a less complete 
contract, leaving the agent substantial discretion and thereby signalling the principal’s trust in the 
agent’s non-opportunistic behaviour” (ibid; 3).   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
By requesting from employees of seven European countries to subjectively evaluate the importance of a 
number of incentive options for their effort, this study has inferred a relative taxonomy of various 
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incentive devices in terms of their perceived effectiveness.  The results have highlighted the important 
role of discretion for the level of effort that employees exert in their jobs, and of pay incentives and 
reciprocal employer-employee behaviour for inducing changes to effort.  They have also emphasized 
the potentially negative role of monitoring for productivity.  The evidence of this paper is therefore 
supportive of the adoption of “participative” management techniques by European organizations.  In 
fact, the ‘menu’ of factors provided within this study, which identifies the conditions under which an 
organization’s personnel policies are likely to enjoy widespread employee support, may provide some 
helpful guidance towards the achievement of that goal.     
Many issues in the study of the psychological dispositions of workers remain unexplored and 
warrant further investigation.  An important consideration for future research is to control for a number 
of cognitive characteristics of the employees (e.g. risk aversion, intrinsic satisfaction, personality) that 
may potentially affect their responses.  Finding the optimal procedures which will allow firms to 
translate the suggestions of its workforce into practice is also vital.  In general, future research needs to 
focus more on employee attitudes and their interface with socio-economic determinants, as this is 
essential for those who wish to design and implement efficient HR strategies that will achieve the 
highest possible motivational potential.    
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Appendix 
 
A1:  Semi-nonparametric estimation of extended ordered probit models  
 
The “semi-nonparametric” estimator proposed by Stewart (2004) can be used for a series of 
generalized ordered response models that nest the OP model and relax the distributional assumption 
),0(~~ 2σε NFi , usually made for the cumulative density function F of the random error term of an 
econometric model such as equation (1).  This method approximates the unknown density F of ε using a 
Hermite form polynomial expansion with Gaussian leading term i.e. the product of a squared 
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polynomial and a normal density.  The choice of a normal density is made deliberately, so that the 
approximation nests the OP model.  The approximation is thus specified as 
 
 
with the scaling factor defined as 
 
where φ(ε) is the standard normal density function and where the normalization γ0 = 1 is required.  The 
required distribution is therefore specified as 
 
 
This defines a family of “semi-nonparametric” (SNP) distributions for increasing values of K. 
Provided that the unknown density of ε satisfies certain smoothness conditions, it can be 
approximated arbitrarily closely by this Hermite series by increasing the choice of K, the degree of the 
polynomial.  By replacing the unknown distribution function F by that in (A3), the model parameters 
are estimated consistently by maximising a pseudo-likelihood function (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). A 
location normalization is, nonetheless, necessary for semi-parametric identification, which is done by 
setting the first threshold, α1, equal to its ordered probit estimate.  Importantly, in the case that K = 0, 1, 
2, the model reduces to the OP model.  The model with K = 3 is therefore the first model in the series 
that is a generalization of the OP model.  In practice, inference is conducted conditional on K, possibly 
for a range of alternative values of K, with the final specification of the model chosen by testing 
between them.   
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A2: Cross-country robustness of empirical findings  
 
A number of management studies (Chiang and Birtch, 2005; Hofstede, 1980; Marjaana et al., 2005) 
point out that reward type preference may be largely influenced by the value systems inherent in 
different countries (e.g. individualistic vs. collectivist cultures).  As the conclusions of the paper are 
drawn on the basis of a pooled sample of workers from distinct European countries, the cross-country 
robustness of the reported rankings was examined further.   
Table A1 presents the relative standing of the motivational instruments as estimated by a ROL 
model separately for each country.  Interesting national differences in the taxonomy of the importance 
of different incentive devices for the effort decisions of workers emerge.  For instance, French 
employees believe that pay incentives are more essential for their level of exerted effort, while the 
Greeks consider monitoring as the most essential ingredient of motivation.  Greek employees also stand 
out in terms of the factors eliciting extra effort, as peer pressure and layoff risk come up at the top of 
their rankings, while efficiency wages are remarkably at the bottom.8  Peer pressure plays a primary 
role in the effort decisions of Dutch employees as well.   
Despite these differences, it is noteworthy that a remarkable degree of cross-country consistency is 
exhibited in terms of the perceived importance of the options ‘discretion’ and ‘peer-- or ‘customer- 
pressure’ for the level of effort, and of ‘pay incentives’ and ‘efficiency wages’ for changes in effort.  
Monitoring (in the form of appraisals and/or supervision) and Taylor-type assembly lines, in contrast, 
are consistently believed to be less vital for the effort decisions of the sampled employees.   
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Table 2:  Summary statistics, EPICURUS survey, 2004 
 Mean sd 
Demographic: Gender  0.50 (0.50) 
- Age 37.25 (10.64) 
- > upper secondary education 0.76 (0.43) 
Job-related:  Private sector 0.63 (0.48) 
- Trade union member 0.34 (0.47) 
- Actual Weekly Hours  37.77 (10.19) 
- Hourly wage (€) 9.50 (15.82) 
- Promotion probability 0.32 (0.47) 
- Paid Overtime Hours 7.78 (8.35) 
- Clocking/sign-in 0.20 (0.40) 
Job security: Permanent contract 0.83 (0.38) 
- U last year 0.11 (0.31) 
- Probability stop job 0.56 (0.50) 
Teamwork :  Same people 0.66 (0.47) 
- Rotating teams 0.16 (0.36) 
- Mostly on own 0.18 (0.38) 
Task complexity: Fixed routine 0.29 (0.45) 
- Variety of duties 0.64 (0.48) 
- Autonomy 0.07 (0.26) 
Firm Size: <10 0.15 (0.36) 
- 10-24 0.21 (0.40) 
- 25-99 0.22 (0.41) 
- 100-499 0.22 (0.41) 
- > 500 0.20 (0.40) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.14 (0.35) 
- Wholesale/retail 0.12 (0.33) 
- Services 0.30 (0.46) 
Table 1: Predicted effects of the perceived effectiveness of incentive options by characteristics 
Incentive  
Factor 
PPR Discr. Akerlof Risk Fellow Client Super Appr. Assem. 
↑ Age - +  -   - -  
Female ±  - +     - 
↑ Tenure -   -   - -  
↑ Pay +  - -      
↑Relative Pay +  -       
Monitoring environment          
↑Firm Size +  - + - -   + 
Repetitive + -       + 
Variety of duties - +   +   + - 
Autonomy - +   -  -  - 
Workplace Relations          
Employee-Employee -  -  +     
Employee-Super -      + +  
Other job-related          
Job security +   -      
Unions -  - - +   + + 
Public Sector - + - - + -  + - 
Industry: Manufacturing ± -  +  - +  + 
Culture: Individualistic +  +  -     
Notes:  Relationships as predicted by existing literature; + positive effect; - negative effect; ± ambiguous effect. 
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- Public admin/ education/health 0.27 (0.44) 
- Other 0.17 (0.37) 
Relationships: 
 Good relations fellow workers 
0.77 (0.42) 
- Good relations supervisor 0.85 (0.35) 
Correlates of options: Merit Pay 0.07 (0.25) 
- End of year bonus 0.20 (0.40) 
- Extra bonus/stock options 0.20 (0.40) 
- Comparison Pay: Less 0.31 (0.46) 
- Same 0.52 (0.50) 
- More 0.18 (0.38) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Ranking of incentive alternatives in terms of perceived importance 
for level and change in employee effort, EPICURUS survey, 2004 
Level of effort Changes in effort 
own discretion pay incentives 
colleagues paid more than similar qualified workers 
clients/customers risk of losing job 
pay incentives peer opinion 
reports/appraisals reports/appraisals 
supervisor/boss closer contact clients 
assembly line strict supervision 
 speed up assembly line 
Notes: Ranking as predicted by a ROL model. 
 
 
 
Table 4A: Determinants of perceived effectiveness of incentive alternatives for level of 
employee effort, EPICURUS survey, 2004 
 PPR Discretion Fellow Client Super Appraisal Assembly 
Gender Female --- --- --- Female Female Female 
Age Group --- Older Younger Older Younger  --- 
Hours More More --- More --- More --- 
Pay --- --- --- Lower Lower --- --- 
Promotion  --- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Trade 
Union 
--- --- --- --- Yes --- Yes 
Contract Permanent Permanent --- --- --- --- --- 
Non-profit 
sector 
No --- Yes --- --- --- --- 
Civil 
servant 
No No Yes --- --- --- --- 
Firm Size 
Small/ 
v.Large 
--- Medium v.Small 
Medium/ 
v.Large 
--- Medium 
Teamwork --- Alone Not alone --- Not alone --- 
Rotating 
teams/ 
Not alone 
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Task 
complexity 
Fixed 
routine 
Variety/ 
Autonomy 
--- --- 
No 
autonomy 
Variety No variety 
Repetitiven
ess 
Yes No --- --- --- Yes Yes 
Industry 
Wholesale/ 
Retail 
--- --- Services --- --- 
Manufactur
ing 
Perform. 
pay 
Bonuses/ 
options 
--- --- Merit --- Merit --- 
Clocking/ 
sign-in 
Yes --- --- --- --- --- Yes 
Good 
relation  
co-workers 
--- --- Yes --- --- --- --- 
Good 
relation 
supervisor 
No --- --- --- Yes --- --- 
Relative 
Pay 
Less Not same --- More Not same --- --- 
Layoff risk --- --- 
Not 
probable 
--- --- --- --- 
Notes: As predicted by semi-nonparametric estimates of ordered models for each incentive option (eq. 1), indicating a 
higher probability of the perceived effectiveness of each incentive alternative by factor.     
 
 
 
Table 4B: Determinants of the perceived effectiveness of incentive alternatives for changes in 
employee effort, EPICURUS survey, 2004 
 PRP Akerlof Risk Fellow Clients Apprais. Super Assemb. 
Gender --- Female Female --- --- Female --- Male 
Age Group Younger Younger --- Younger --- --- Younger --- 
Hours More More More Less More More --- --- 
Pay --- Lower Lower Lower --- --- Lower Lower 
Promotion  --- Yes --- --- Yes Yes --- Yes 
Trade 
Union  
No --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Contract Permanent --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Non-profit 
sector 
No No --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Firm Size 
Medium/ 
Large 
Medium Large --- Small 
Medium/ 
Large 
Medium/ 
v.Large 
--- 
Teams --- --- --- 
Rotating 
teams/ 
Not alone 
--- --- Not alone Not alone 
Task 
complex 
Fixed 
routine 
No variety 
of duties 
--- --- 
Variety of 
duties/ 
autonomy 
--- 
No 
autonomy 
--- 
Repetitive Yes Yes Yes No  --- Yes Yes Yes 
Industry --- --- --- --- Services --- --- 
Manufactu
ring 
Perform. 
pay 
Merit --- --- --- Merit Merit --- --- 
Clocking/ 
sign-in 
--- Yes --- --- --- --- --- Yes 
Good 
relation 
coworkers 
No --- --- Yes --- --- No Yes 
Good 
relation 
superv. 
--- No Yes --- --- --- --- --- 
Relative 
Pay 
Less Less More --- More 
Same/ 
More 
Same --- 
Layoff risk --- Probable Improbab. --- --- --- --- --- 
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Previous U 
status 
--- --- --- --- --- Yes Yes --- 
Notes: As predicted by semi-nonparametric estimates of ordered models for each incentive option (eq. 1), indicating a higher 
probability of the perceived effectiveness of each incentive alternative by factor.     
 
 
 
Table 5: Match between employee beliefs about importance of PRP and 
actual receipt in workplace, frequency (%), EPICURUS survey, 2004 
Level of effort  
Change in effort  
Actual receipt of PRP  
Employee beliefs No Yes Total 
Not important 
685 (93.32%) 
507 (90.05%) 
49 (6.68%) 
56 (9.95%) 
734 (100%) 
563 (100%) 
Important 
2429 (76.03%) 
2607 (77.45%) 
766 (23.97%) 
759 (22.55%) 
3195 (100%) 
3366 (100%) 
Total 3114 (79.26%) 815 (20.74%) 3929 (100%) 
Notes: Employee beliefs about the ‘importance’ of PRP for job effort generated by a probit model 
with dependent binary variable: 1 if workers rank the effectiveness of PRP highly (scores 4 or 
5), 0 otherwise (see Table A5).  Respondents with predicted probability above 0.5 are regarded 
as workers who “ought” to be paid with PRP to be productive. 
 
 
 
Table A1: Ranking of incentive alternatives in terms of perceived importance for level and 
change in employee effort by country, EPICURUS survey, 2004 
Level of 
effort 
      
Denmark Finland France Greece Netherlands UK Spain 
own 
discretion 
own 
discretion 
own 
discretion 
supervisor/ 
boss 
own 
discretion 
own 
discretion 
own 
discretion 
colleagues 
clients/ 
customers 
pay 
incentives 
own 
discretion 
colleagues colleagues 
clients/ 
customers 
clients/ 
customers 
colleagues 
clients/ 
customers 
pay 
incentives 
clients/ 
customers 
clients/ 
customers 
colleagues 
supervisor/ 
boss 
pay 
incentives 
reports/ 
appraisals 
reports/ 
appraisals 
pay 
incentives 
pay 
incentives 
pay 
incentives 
pay 
incentives 
supervisor/ 
boss 
colleagues 
clients/ 
customers 
supervisor/ 
boss 
supervisor/ 
boss 
reports/ 
appraisals 
----- 
reports/ 
appraisals 
supervisor/ 
boss 
colleagues 
reports/ 
appraisals 
reports/ 
appraisals 
supervisor/ 
boss 
assembly line assembly line assembly line assembly line assembly line assembly line assembly line 
Change in 
effort 
      
pay 
incentives 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
pay 
incentives 
peer opinion peer opinion 
pay 
incentives 
pay 
incentives 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
pay 
incentives 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
risk of losing 
job- 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
closer contact 
clients 
peer opinion 
reports/ 
appraisals 
pay 
incentives 
pay 
incentives 
peer opinion peer opinion 
risk of losing 
job 
closer contact 
clients 
risk of losing 
job 
reports/ 
appraisals 
closer contact 
clients 
risk of losing 
job 
closer contact 
clients 
reports/ 
appraisals 
risk of losing 
job 
closer contact 
clients 
closer contact 
clients 
reports/ 
appraisals 
reports/ 
appraisals 
risk of losing 
job 
 29 
peer opinion 
reports/ 
appraisals 
peer opinion 
strict 
supervision 
risk of losing 
job 
closer contact 
clients 
reports/ 
appraisals 
speed up 
assembly line 
strict 
supervision 
strict 
supervision 
speed up 
assembly line 
strict 
supervision 
strict 
supervision 
strict 
supervision 
strict 
supervision 
speed up 
assembly line 
speed up 
assembly line 
paid more 
than s.q.w 
speed up 
assembly line 
speed up 
assembly line 
speed up 
assembly line 
Notes: Ranking as predicted by a ROL model. 
 
 
 
Table A4A: SNP Estimates of Perceived Effectiveness of Incentive Options for Level of Effort, 
EPICURUS survey, 2004 
 PPR Discretion Fellow Client Super Appraisal Assembly 
Demograph. 
Male 
-0.099*** -0.031 -0.012 -0.030 -0.175*** -0.229*** 0.148*** 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.054) (0.039) (0.044) (0.047) 
Agegroup: 
40-65 
-0.001 0.131*** -0.118*** 0.128* -0.168*** -0.022 0.041 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.037) (0.077) (0.042) (0.040) (0.050) 
Education: 
> upper 
secondary 
-0.091* -0.049 -0.011 0.043 -0.055 -0.124*** -0.038 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.044) (0.068) (0.050) (0.046) (0.056) 
Job-related 
ln(Weekly 
Hours) 
0.282*** 0.183*** 0.014 0.177* -0.083 0.197*** -0.043 
 (0.042) (0.065) (0.041) (0.097) (0.052) (0.048) (0.084) 
ln(Pay) -0.023 0.018 -0.022 -0.185*** -0.080** -0.016 -0.031 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.033) (0.053) (0.038) (0.037) (0.051) 
Promotion  0.061 0.077** 0.062* 0.149** 0.144*** 0.248*** 0.063 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.068) (0.041) (0.047) (0.049) 
Trade 
Union  
-0.030 0.052 0.032 0.081 0.114** 0.057 0.136** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.069) (0.045) (0.043) (0.054) 
Clock/sign  0.087* 0.067 -0.029 -0.042 0.037 0.030 0.259*** 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.102) (0.046) (0.041) (0.052) 
Sector 
- Non-profit 
-0.163** 0.059 0.228*** -0.121 -0.007 0.035 -0.168 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.069) (0.118) (0.082) (0.073) (0.116) 
- Civil 
Servant 
-0.247*** -0.111* 0.131** -0.134 0.007 -0.007 -0.088 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.057) (0.089) (0.062) (0.062) (0.081) 
- Public -0.075 -0.021 0.068 0.012 -0.061 0.014 -0.046 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.050) (0.085) (0.057) (0.052) (0.072) 
Firm Size 
- 10-24 
0.123* -0.037 0.070 -0.208** 0.009 0.049 -0.008 
 (0.064) (0.053) (0.055) (0.088) (0.065) (0.058) (0.074) 
- 25-99 0.071 -0.055 0.164*** -0.459*** 0.117* 0.091 0.119* 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.053) (0.110) (0.061) (0.057) (0.070) 
- 100-499 0.068 -0.038 0.075 -0.571*** -0.008 0.070 0.131* 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.053) (0.136) (0.064) (0.060) (0.073) 
- > 500 0.108* -0.026 0.083 -0.524*** 0.122* 0.098 0.035 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.056) (0.127) (0.068) (0.064) (0.079) 
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Job security 
Permanent 
0.125** 0.097* 0.011 0.071 -0.033 0.061 0.021 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.047) (0.080) (0.057) (0.055) (0.066) 
U last year  0.101 0.049 0.024 -0.024 0.010 0.040 0.039 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.055) (0.105) (0.066) (0.058) (0.074) 
Turnover: 
Probable 
0.038 0.017 -0.061* -0.054 0.044 0.036 -0.018 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.055) (0.037) (0.035) (0.045) 
Teams  
- Rotating 
0.021 0.065 0.060 0.065 -0.011 0.069 0.138** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) (0.078) (0.050) (0.049) (0.061) 
- Alone 0.022 0.113** -0.431*** 0.040 -0.204*** -0.083 -0.115* 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.059) (0.100) (0.054) (0.051) (0.062) 
Tasks  
- Variety of 
duties 
-0.080* 0.252*** -0.027 0.013 0.008 0.097** -0.095* 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.041) (0.066) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056) 
- Autonomy -0.138* 0.332*** -0.106 0.097 -0.292*** -0.051 -0.161 
 (0.082) (0.101) (0.068) (0.121) (0.086) (0.081) (0.106) 
Repetitive  
- Sometimes 
-0.124*** 0.065 0.019 -0.064 -0.045 -0.075* -0.140*** 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.109) (0.044) (0.043) (0.053) 
- No -0.155** 0.166*** -0.028 -0.015 -0.100 -0.197*** -0.248*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.055) (0.117) (0.063) (0.068) (0.078) 
Industry  
Wholesale/ 
retail 
0.132* 0.049 0.030 0.517** 0.013 0.019 -0.531*** 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.053) (0.210) (0.070) (0.063) (0.077) 
- Services 0.041 0.059 0.021 0.333** -0.054 0.036 -0.436*** 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.045) (0.147) (0.057) (0.054) (0.066) 
- Public 
admin/educ/ 
health 
0.009 0.115 0.027 0.169 -0.008 -0.010 -0.536*** 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.061) (0.122) (0.071) (0.068) (0.087) 
- Other -0.003 0.057 0.021 0.178* -0.018 -0.044 -0.322*** 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.054) (0.105) (0.065) (0.061) (0.076) 
Relations 
Good with 
co-workers 
-0.016 0.024 0.202*** 0.108 -0.050 0.023 -0.017 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.075) (0.044) (0.041) (0.054) 
Bad with 
supervisor 
0.140** 0.078 0.029 -0.028 -0.167* -0.033 -0.014 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.067) (0.106) (0.101) (0.075) (0.095) 
Incentives  
- Merit pay 
0.102 0.099 -0.058 0.441*** 0.041 0.180*** -0.005 
 (0.067) (0.063) (0.056) (0.124) (0.071) (0.066) (0.087) 
- End of 
year Bonus 
0.145*** 0.061 0.004 0.006 0.015 0.053 -0.041 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.036) (0.059) (0.045) (0.042) (0.056) 
- Extra pay: 
bonuses/ 
options 
0.135** 0.056 0.030 0.028 0.043 0.020 -0.008 
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.040) (0.063) (0.048) (0.044) (0.058) 
Relative Pay  -0.197*** -0.081** 0.014 0.031 -0.085** 0.037 -0.024 
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- Same 
 (0.054) (0.037) (0.036) (0.068) (0.043) (0.039) (0.050) 
- More -0.225*** -0.024 -0.038 0.126* -0.030 0.012 0.013 
 (0.063) (0.053) (0.047) (0.075) (0.055) (0.053) (0.065) 
Country  
- Denmark 
-0.126* 0.310*** 0.326*** 0.507*** 0.651*** NA -0.187* 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.066) (0.185) (0.075) NA (0.099) 
- France 0.284*** 0.128* -0.474*** 0.203 0.069 0.195*** 0.651*** 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.064) (0.220) (0.065) (0.073) (0.104) 
- Greece 0.233** -0.035 -0.512*** -0.354** 0.833*** -0.602*** -0.548*** 
 (0.108) (0.079) (0.072) (0.142) (0.080) (0.094) (0.099) 
- Holland -0.332*** 0.032 0.192*** -0.086 0.033 -0.454*** -0.317*** 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.055) (0.085) (0.062) (0.092) (0.117) 
- Spain -0.141 -0.157* -0.366*** -0.261* -0.182** -0.802*** -0.201* 
 (0.090) (0.083) (0.080) (0.135) (0.091) (0.121) (0.115) 
- Finland -0.078 0.435*** -0.031 0.252 0.219** -0.444*** -0.616*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.080) (0.161) (0.092) (0.074) (0.097) 
N 3792 3883 3898 3802 3888 3125 3169 
Wald 
chi2(42) 
213.98*** 121.18*** 337.22*** 55.86* 394.76*** 108.90*** 853.63*** 
LR test  
OP vs. SNP 
χ2(1) 
55.22*** 7.16*** 46.57*** 0.84 9.62*** 47.55*** 43.52*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference groups: Agegroup: 18-39; 
Education: Below upper secondary; Sector: Private; Firm Size: < 10; Teams: Same people; Tasks: Fixed routines; 
Repetitive: Yes; Industry: Manufacturing; Relative Pay: Less; Country: UK. 
 
 
 
Table A4B: SNP Estimates of Perceived Effectiveness of Incentive Options for Changes in Effort, 
EPICURUS survey, 2004 
         
 PRP Akerlof Risk Fellow Clients Appraisal Super Assembly 
Demograp. 
Male 
-0.021 -0.086** -0.092*** 0.014 -0.035 -0.203*** 0.023 0.166*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) 
Agegroup: 
40-65 
-0.145*** -0.151*** -0.062 -0.070* 0.057 -0.055 -0.135*** -0.049 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049) 
Education: 
> upper 
second. 
-0.119*** -0.030 0.003 -0.008 -0.051 -0.107* -0.040 -0.025 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.049) (0.051) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) 
Job-related 
ln(Weekly 
Hours) 
0.216*** 0.257*** 0.210*** -0.092* 0.162*** 0.153*** 0.017 0.081 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.081) (0.052) (0.056) (0.048) (0.058) (0.080) 
ln(Pay) -0.060 -0.087** -0.119*** -0.079* -0.075 -0.036 -0.113** -0.105** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) 
Promotion  0.058 0.088** 0.022 0.064 0.136** 0.224*** 0.034 0.089* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.054) (0.044) (0.047) (0.049) 
Trade 
Union  
-0.084** 0.052 -0.010 -0.024 0.074 0.001 -0.053 0.045 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) 
Clock/sign 0.031 0.097** -0.018 -0.017 0.054 -0.001 -0.024 0.160*** 
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 (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.048) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) 
Sector 
- Nonprofit 
-0.264*** -0.156** 0.060 0.061 0.078 -0.075 -0.016 -0.075 
 (0.077) (0.079) (0.070) (0.080) (0.092) (0.083) (0.098) (0.109) 
- Civil 
Servant 
-0.079 -0.065 -0.012 0.052 0.008 -0.076 0.066 -0.066 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.072) (0.077) (0.078) 
- Public  -0.039 -0.039 -0.007 0.017 0.043 0.040 -0.067 0.029 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.062) (0.066) (0.070) (0.072) 
Firm Size:  
- 10-24 
0.181*** 0.139** 0.108* 0.020 -0.155** 0.077 0.070 -0.031 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) (0.065) (0.074) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073) 
- 25-99 0.166*** 0.091* 0.031 0.048 -0.308*** 0.208*** 0.200*** 0.104 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.061) (0.104) (0.066) (0.072) (0.070) 
- 100-499 0.195*** 0.090 0.113** 0.042 -0.408*** 0.167** 0.084 0.066 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.063) (0.121) (0.069) (0.073) (0.073) 
- > 500 0.166*** 0.063 0.122** 0.050 -0.352*** 0.202*** 0.133* 0.095 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.113) (0.072) (0.076) (0.077) 
Job 
security  
Permanent 
0.129*** 0.059 -0.082 -0.017 0.053 -0.024 -0.037 0.013 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060) (0.068) (0.065) 
Turnover: 
Probable 
0.031 0.118*** -0.115*** -0.020 -0.038 -0.001 -0.029 0.005 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) 
U last year  0.067 -0.037 0.056 0.025 0.096 0.139** 0.142* 0.045 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.073) (0.068) (0.081) (0.073) 
         
Teams  
- Rotating 
0.008 0.065 0.006 0.124** 0.041 0.085 0.038 0.060 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.051) (0.061) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) 
- Alone -0.028 0.066 -0.083 -0.265*** 0.059 -0.034 -0.296*** -0.187*** 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.055) (0.050) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) 
Tasks:   
-Variety of 
duties 
-0.076* -0.169*** -0.008 0.075 0.111** 0.058 0.028 -0.006 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
-Autonomy -0.137* -0.106 -0.106 -0.068 0.231** -0.103 -0.210** -0.123 
 (0.077) (0.080) (0.088) (0.086) (0.091) (0.099) (0.104) (0.098) 
Repetitive 
Sometimes 
-0.055 -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.085* -0.047 -0.097* -0.129** -0.153*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) 
No -0.170*** -0.243*** -0.231*** -0.077 -0.053 -0.143** -0.240*** -0.317*** 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.072) (0.078) (0.078) 
Industry 
Wholesale/
retail 
0.017 -0.004 -0.009 0.066 0.260*** -0.101 -0.002 -0.364*** 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.066) (0.074) (0.073) (0.080) (0.079) 
- Services -0.045 -0.020 0.028 0.028 0.201*** -0.073 -0.038 -0.298*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065) (0.062) (0.067) (0.066) 
- Public 
admin/edu/ 
health 
-0.005 0.059 0.010 0.004 0.248*** 0.025 -0.049 -0.433*** 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.071) (0.073) (0.077) (0.080) (0.086) (0.085) 
Other -0.058 -0.068 0.034 0.067 0.129* -0.183*** -0.137* -0.275*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.074) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076) 
Relations 
Good with 
 co-workers 
-0.082** -0.002 0.004 0.212*** 0.072 -0.025 -0.153*** 0.091* 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.055) 
Bad with 
supervisor 
0.078 0.168** -0.170** -0.071 0.112 -0.053 -0.125 -0.047 
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 (0.070) (0.072) (0.069) (0.075) (0.088) (0.087) (0.092) (0.091) 
Incentives 
- Merit pay 
0.125** 0.048 0.067 0.028 0.249*** 0.263*** 0.042 -0.062 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.069) (0.084) (0.076) (0.087) (0.084) 
- End of 
year Bonus 
0.063 0.000 0.048 0.019 0.065 0.059 -0.008 -0.000 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.058) (0.047) (0.054) (0.055) 
- Extra 
pay: bonus/ 
options 
-0.002 -0.034 0.009 0.049 0.041 0.043 0.077 -0.021 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) 
Relative 
Pay  
- Same 
-0.104*** -0.204*** 0.050 -0.025 0.026 0.104** 0.085* 0.016 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) 
- More -0.119** -0.228*** 0.178*** 0.006 0.145** 0.137** 0.039 0.078 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) 
Country  
- Denmark 
-0.470*** -0.321*** -0.006 -0.755*** 0.384*** -0.509*** -0.340*** 0.204** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.065) (0.072) (0.104) (0.085) (0.090) (0.098) 
- France -0.082 0.250*** 0.280*** -0.398*** 0.441*** 0.506*** 0.538*** 0.097 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.075) (0.063) (0.088) (0.069) (0.093) (0.073) 
- Greece -0.306*** -1.213*** 0.653*** 1.134*** 0.351*** 0.959*** 1.247*** 1.108*** 
 (0.065) (0.074) (0.086) (0.085) (0.095) (0.092) (0.117) (0.081) 
- Holland -0.744*** -0.389*** -0.144** 0.139** -0.036 -0.250*** -0.177** -0.291*** 
 (0.071) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.074) (0.076) (0.079) 
- Spain -0.258*** -0.182* -0.157 -0.021 0.283*** -0.097 0.333*** 0.085 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.116) (0.090) (0.106) (0.100) (0.106) (0.099) 
- Finland -0.542*** -0.017 -0.365*** -0.426*** -0.154 -0.689*** -0.113 -0.023 
 (0.085) (0.087) (0.080) (0.088) (0.125) (0.115) (0.107) (0.106) 
N 3806 3799 3812 3829 3748 3792 3793 3089 
Wald 
chi2(42) 
421.51*** 718.27*** 395.70*** 823.33** 192.93*** 393.55*** 208.76*** 776.93*** 
LR test  
OP vs. 
SNP χ2(1) 
19.24*** 177.42*** 11.99*** 8.19*** 28.23*** 30.37*** 8.22*** 9.56*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference groups: Agegroup: 18-39; Education: 
Below upper secondary; Sector: Private; Firm Size: < 10; Teams: Same people; Tasks: Fixed routines; Repetitive: Yes; Industry: 
Manufacturing; Relative Pay: Less; Country: UK. 
 
 
 
Table A5 Probit model of effectiveness of ‘pay incentives’ option 
 Coeff. Marginal Effect 
Demographic 
Male 
-0.018 -0.006 
 (0.047) (0.017) 
Agegroup: 40-65 -0.200*** -0.071*** 
 (0.050) (0.018) 
Education: > upper secondary -0.102* -0.035* 
 (0.057) (0.019) 
Job related: ln(Weekly Hours) 0.280*** 0.098*** 
 (0.078) (0.027) 
Ln(Pay) -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.051) (0.018) 
Promotion 0.081 0.028 
 (0.051) (0.017) 
Trade union -0.060 -0.021 
 (0.057) (0.020) 
Clocking/signing-in 0.034 0.012 
 (0.059) (0.020) 
Sector: Non-profit -0.309*** -0.114*** 
 (0.104) (0.040) 
- Civil service -0.091 -0.032 
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 (0.079) (0.028) 
- Public Company -0.023 -0.008 
 (0.077) (0.027) 
Firm Size: 10-24 0.191** 0.064*** 
 (0.077) (0.025) 
- 25-99 0.158** 0.054** 
 (0.074) (0.024) 
- 100-499 0.218*** 0.073*** 
 (0.076) (0.025) 
- > 500 0.123 0.042 
 (0.079) (0.027) 
Job security: Permanent contract 0.173*** 0.062** 
 (0.066) (0.024) 
- Turnover: Probable -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.016) 
- U last year 0.115 0.039 
 (0.081) (0.027) 
Teams: Rotating -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.065) (0.023) 
- Alone -0.092 -0.033 
 (0.061) (0.022) 
Tasks: Variety of duties -0.108* -0.037* 
 (0.061) (0.021) 
- Autonomy -0.259*** -0.095** 
 (0.098) (0.037) 
Repetitive: Sometimes -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.056) (0.020) 
- No -0.201*** -0.072*** 
 (0.074) (0.028) 
Industry: Wholesale/retail -0.093 -0.033 
 (0.087) (0.031) 
- Services -0.061 -0.021 
 (0.074) (0.026) 
- Public admin/educ/health -0.043 -0.015 
 (0.092) (0.032) 
- Other -0.108 -0.038 
 (0.084) (0.030) 
Relationships:  
Good with co-workers 
-0.092* -0.032* 
 (0.056) (0.019) 
Bad with supervisor 0.077 0.026 
 (0.094) (0.032) 
Relative Pay: Same -0.114** -0.040** 
 (0.052) (0.018) 
- More -0.113* -0.040* 
 (0.067) (0.024) 
Country: Denmark -0.741*** -0.279*** 
 (0.092) (0.035) 
- France -0.378*** -0.139*** 
 (0.083) (0.031) 
- Greece -0.418*** -0.155*** 
 (0.094) (0.036) 
- Netherlands -0.967*** -0.364*** 
 (0.083) (0.031) 
- Spain -0.426*** -0.160*** 
 (0.112) (0.044) 
- Finland -0.724*** -0.277*** 
 (0.112) (0.044) 
Constant 0.249  
 (0.324)  
N 3806 3806 
R2 0.09 0.09 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference groups: Agegroup: 
18-39; Education: Below upper secondary; Sector: Private; Firm Size: < 10; Teams: Same people; Tasks 
complexity: Fixed routines; Repetitive: Yes; Industry: Manufacturing; Relative Pay: Less; Country: UK. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In designing the questionnaire we were constrained by the need to strike a balance between retaining a parsimonious set of incentive options, 
on the one hand, which would enhance the response reliability of the respondents, and allowing for the necessary complexity that provides 
behavioural realism, on the other. 
 
Therefore, and given that the sample includes workers who are mostly employed in the secondary sector of 
the labour market, the chosen options do not encapsulate the entirety of motivating mechanisms that have been discussed in the literature, and 
specifically those mostly associated with white-collar jobs (e.g. promotions, career concerns etc.). 
2 The former emphasizes the importance of management rewarding performance via rewards that are valued by the employees, while the latter 
focuses on worker reactions that aim to restore equity perceptions whenever inequitable output-input outcomes relative to a comparator group 
emerge. 
3 This entailed having the text of the survey translated into each country’s language by native speakers, so as to avoid any inconsistencies in 
terminology.
  
The members were invited by e-mail to answer the questionnaire, and within this large population respondents were screened 
through their answers to the first five questions.  Each member of the panel that did not fulfil the criteria of stratification was then forced to 
stop answering the questionnaire and was thanked for their cooperation. 
4 We have also estimated an ordered probit model which controls for the effect of individual and current job characteristics on the workers’ 
stated effort choices, and which includes country-dummies that take into consideration potential cultural or institutional differences on reward 
preferences (available from the authors upon request).  The rankings of the ROL model of Table 3 remain largely unaffected.       
5 This estimator is available from the econometric software STATA in the form of the command ‘sneop’.  
6 The results are robust to small fluctuations in the cut-off value.  The estimates of the probit model of the perceived effectiveness of the PRP 
option are available in the Appendix (Table A5). 
7 A similar methodology is used by Belfield and Marsden (2003), who examine the potential mismatch between the predicted and actual usage 
of PRP systems by workplaces on the basis of their monitoring environments.  
8 It is acknowledged that the unconventional results found for Greece may be attributed to the different data collection mode (face-to-face 
surveys) as opposed to the Internet questionnaire used in the other countries.  Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that all necessary efforts 
were made to make the Greek interviewing process as comparable as possible to the remaining countries.  One also needs to take into account 
the important dissimilarities between the Greek economy and the rest of the EU (e.g. high share of agricultural and public sector employment 
and a disporortionate share of self-employment within small or medium-sized firms). 
